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Competition	between	Social	Groups,	In-group	
Favoritism	and	Population-level	Cooperation	Janos	Zoltan	Varga	
University	of	Szeged	
Abstract	Humans	 are	 social	 beings;	 people	 are	 predisposed	 to	 join	 groups,	categorize	 the	social	world	 into	groups,	and	prefer	 fellow	 in-group	members	 over	 out-group	members.	 Social	 groups	 in	 turn	 compete	for	 individuals	 and	 especially	 for	 the	 resources	 of	 individuals	 to	maintain	the	cultural	practices	and	symbolic	markers	of	 the	group.	We	 modeled	 the	 effect	 of	 this	 competition	 on	 population	 level	cooperation.	 Using	 game	 theoretic	 and	 network	 science	 methods,	we	 found	 that	 groups	 would	 develop	 and	 maintain	 norms	 that	restrict	 their	 members	 to	 join	 other	 groups.	 If	 every	 group	 can	maintain	such	norms	against	every	other	group	(the	topology	of	the	group-network	 is	 complete),	 the	 society	 is	 composed	 of	 closed	communities	which	do	not	cooperate	with	each	other.	Changing	the	topology	 of	 the	 group-network	 can	 yield	 larger	 cooperating	components	within	 the	population,	 because,	 in	 this	 case,	members	of	 antagonistic	 groups	 can	 join	 a	 third	 group,	 thereby	 allowing	cooperation	between	them.	The	results	suggest	that	the	individuals’	ability	to	join	more	than	one	social	group	is	crucial	for	maintaining	cooperation	in	large	populations.		
Introduction	Groups	 play	 an	 essential	 role	 in	 the	 structure	 of	 human	 societies:	 humans	 are	inherently	social	beings;	people	are	predisposed	to	join	groups	and	to	derive	part	of	their	identity	and	self-esteem	from	group–membership	(Baumeister	and	Leary	1995;	 Fiske	 1992;	 Hogg	 et	 al.	 2008;	 Leary	 and	 Baumeister	 2000;	 Leary	 2010;	Tajfel	and	Turner	2004).	Social	exclusion,	 lack	of	group	membership	can	lead	to	psychological	 and	 physical	 symptoms	 (Cikara	 and	Van	Bavel	 2014;	DeWall	 and	Richman	 2011;	 Eisenberger	 et	 al.	 2003;	 Gardner	 et.	 al	 2000;	 Kerr	 and	 Levine	2008;	Pickett,	Gardner	2005),	suggesting	that	human	psychological	mechanisms	reflect	 an	 important	 aspect	 of	 the	 evolutionary	 history	 of	 the	 species,	 namely,	living	 in	 groups	 for	 millions	 of	 years	 (Boehm	 2012;	 Bowles	 and	 Gintis	 2011;	
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Dunbar	and	Shultz	2007;	Neuberg	et	al.	2010;	Richerson	and	Boyd	2005;	Sober	and	Wilson	1998).	As	the	community	gets	bigger	and	more	complex,	 in	order	to	be	 able	 to	 cope	 with	 the	 computational	 demands	 of	 the	 social	 world,	 people	perceive	 more	 categories,	 more	 groups	 (Macrea	 and	 Bodenhausen	 2000),	 and	individuals	can	become	members	of	more	 than	one	group	at	 the	same	time,	e.g.	family,	ethnic	and	religious	community,	nation,	workplace	groups,	 imagined	and	virtual	communities	(Anderson	2016;	Brewer	2010).			 A	 social	 group	 has	 important,	 distinctive	 features—norms.	 Norms	 are	informal	 rules	 that	 emerge	 through	 interactions	 of	 the	 members,	 guide	 and	restrict	 the	 behavior	 of	 members,	 and	 distinguish	 one	 group	 from	 another	(Cialdini	and	Trost	1998;	Hogg	2010;	Kameda	et	al.	2005;	Richerson	and	Heinrich	2012;	 Sanfey	 et	 al.	 2014).	Humans	 have	 an	 innate	 predisposition	 to	 internalize	the	norms	of	the	groups	they	belong	to	(Chudek	and	Heinrich	2011;	Spitzer	et	al.	2007)	and	they	devote	resources	(most	importantly	time	and	cognitive	capacity,	but	 also	 material	 resources)	 to	 maintain	 the	 cultural	 practices	 of	 the	 given	community.	 A	 social	 group	 without	 members	 to	 practice	 its	 norms	 is	 non-existent—the	norms	 that	governed	 the	behavior	of	members	of	historical	 social	groups	can	still	be	preserved	and	known,	but	no	one	is	actually	a	member	of	that	group,	so	it	does	not	play	any	role	in	the	social	structure	of	the	current	societies	(for	 example,	 we	 possess	 knowledge	 of	 the	 norms	 held	 by	 the	 priesthood	 of	Cybele,	 the	 originally	 Anatolian	 goddess,	 later	 adopted	 in	 ancient	 Greece	 and	Rome,	 but	 that	 religious	 cult	 has	 become	 merely	 historical	 since	 it	 has	 no	followers	anymore	to	internalize	those	norms,	see	e.g.	Ferguson	1985).		 Moreover,	 individuals	 develop	 so-called	 in-group	 favoritism,	 that	 is,	 they	prefer	 fellow	 group	members	 over	 out-group	members,	 and	 are	more	 likely	 to	cooperate	with	 them	than	others	 (Darley	2008;	Efferson	et	al.	2008;	Voci	2006;	Everett	et	al.	2015;	Fu	et	al.	2012	Greenwald	and	Pettigrew	2014).			 Social	groups	in	turn	are	competing	for	the	resources	of	members,	especially	for	 their	 time,	 to	maintain	 the	 cultural	 practices,	 norms,	 and	 symbolic	markers	that	 distinguish	 them	 from	 other	 groups.	 In	 this	 study,	we	 investigate	 how	 the	group	competition	for	members	and	for	their	resources	along	with	the	interplay	between	 in-group	 favoritism	 and	 multi-group	 membership	 affect	 population-level	 cooperation.	 To	 end	 this,	 we	 developed	 a	 model	 which	 applies	 game	theoretic	and	network	science	methods.		
The	Model	In	 the	 model,	 it	 is	 assumed	 that	 people	 cooperate	 only	 with	 their	 in-group	partners.	If	there	is	only	one	group	in	the	society	and	everyone	is	a	member,	then	cooperation	 is	 complete	 in	 the	 sense	 that	 in-group	 favoritism	 is	 applied	 to	everyone,	so	no-one	is	excluded	from	that	due	to	group	membership	(see	Figure	1.	a).		
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Figure	 1.	 Social	 structure	 and	 cooperation.	 The	 graphs	 in	 the	 first	 row	 show	group	 membership.	 The	 colored	 and	 white	 nodes	 represent	 individuals	 and	groups,	 respectively.	 An	 edge	 between	 a	 group	 and	 an	 individual	 represents	group	membership.	 Edge	 between	 groups	means	 possible	 strategic	 interaction;	dual	membership	 is	 not	 allowed	 between	 connected	 groups.	 The	 lower	 graphs	are	the	individual	projection	graphs	of	the	upper	graphs,	where	an	edge	indicates	cooperation	between	two	individuals.	(a)	One	group,	every	individual	is	member	of	the	same	group,	the	projection	graph	is	complete,	i.e.	everyone	cooperates	with	everyone	 else.	 (b)	Two	 groups,	 dual	membership	 is	 not	 allowed,	 the	 projection	graph	 is	 disconnected.	 (c)	 Two	 groups,	 dual-membership	 is	 allowed,	 the	projection	 graph	 is	 connected.	 (d)	 Three	 groups,	 dual-membership	 is	 partly	allowed,	the	projection	graph	is	connected.		However,	 with	 two	 (or	 more)	 groups,	 individuals	 might	 be	 members	 of	 one	group,	but	not	the	other(s).	In	this	case,	they	do	not	cooperate	with	people	from	the	other	social	group,	and	the	community	becomes	fragmented	(see	Figure	1.b).	This	problem	can	be	solved	by	allowing	individuals	to	join	both	groups;	thereby	they	can	cooperate	with	individuals	from	both	groups	(see	Figure	1.c).	This	social	structure	can	be	grasped	by	using	a	bipartite	graph	in	which	there	are	two	types	of	nodes:	one	represents	the	individuals	(colored	ones	in	Figure	1),	the	other	the	social	groups	(white	ones	in	Figure	1),	an	edge	between	an	individual	and	a	group	represents	 membership.	 The	 projection	 of	 individuals	 in	 the	 graph	 shows	 the	cooperation	 network	 between	 individuals	 (see	 Methods	 section).	 That	 is,	 the	projection	 graph	 is	 derived	 from	 the	 bipartite	 graph	 such	 that	 individuals	constitute	 the	 nodes	 of	 the	 projection,	 and	 an	 edge	 between	 two	 individuals	indicates	they	are	members	of	the	same	group	(see	the	graphs	in	the	second	row	in	 Figure	 1),	 hence	 they	 can	 cooperate	with	 each	 other	 directly.	 In	 this	 case,	 a	
a b	 c d
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fragmented	 society	 is	 understood	 as	 a	 projection	 graph	which	 is	 not	 connected	(see	 Figure	 1.b);	 there	 are	 sub	 groups	which	 do	 not	 have	 connections	 to	 other	parts	of	the	graph.			 In	our	model,	there	are	n	individuals	and	m	groups.	The	individuals	start	with	an	 initial	 resource	 endowment,	 r.	 A	 fraction	 of	 this	 resource	 (r/k,	 k>0)	 is	randomly	 allocated	 to	 one	 of	 the	 groups,	 thereby	 the	 individual	 becomes	 a	member	 of	 that	 group.	 The	 process	 is	 repeated	 until	 all	 the	 endowment	 is	distributed	 to	 groups.	 During	 this	 process,	 the	 situation	 when	 an	 individual,	already	member	of	one	group	and	joins	a	new	one,	can	be	seen	as	 in	a	strategic	situation	 between	 the	 two	 corresponding	 groups:	 cooperation	 in	 the	 case	 of	 a	group	means	allowing	its	members	to	join	the	other	group,	while	defection	means	forbidding	it.	To	be	precise,	defection	means	that	there	are	certain	norms	in	the	group	which	 implicitly	or	explicitly	restrict	 the	members	 from	 joining	 the	other	group.	 For	 example,	 the	 fans	 of	 the	 Boston	 Red	 Sox	 and	 New	 York	 Yankees	baseball	 teams	hardly	 root	 for	 the	 rival	 team,	 or	 for	 another	 example,	 consider	the	 institution	 of	 dual-citizenship;	 the	 process	 of	 acquiring	 a	 first	 citizenship	 is	usually	straightforward,	but	gaining	a	second	one	is	conditional:	one	usually	must	apply	and	meet	certain	criteria.			 Why	would	such	norms	and	conditions	exist?	When	an	 individual	 joins	 two	(or	more)	groups,	she	has	to	divide	her	resources	between	the	groups.	However,	if	 a	 group	 restricts	 its	members	 from	 joining	 the	other	group,	 there	 is	 a	 chance	that	the	individual	will	spend	the	rest	of	her	resources	on	the	given	group	as	well.	Specifically,	in	the	model,	whenever	an	individual	becomes	a	member	of	2	groups	and	both	are	cooperators	vis-à-vis	each	other,	the	individual	remains	a	member	of	both	 groups.	 If	 one	 of	 the	 groups	 defects,	 then	 the	 individual	 withdraws	 the	resource	(r/k)	devoted	to	the	cooperating	group	and	it	is	reallocated	randomly	to	a	 group,	 so	 given	 the	 number	 of	 groups	 is	m,	 then	 with	 1/m	 probability	 the	resource	 is	 reallocated	 to	 the	 defector	 group.	 In	 case	 of	 2	 defector	 groups,	 the	individual	 randomly	 withdraws	 the	 resource	 from	 one	 of	 them,	 and	 it	 is	reallocated	to	a	group	randomly.	The	exact	payoff	matrix	of	the	situation	can	be	seen	in	Table	1.			 	
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Table	1.	Payoff	matrix	between	two	groups	(row	player	perspective)*		
	 C	 	 D	C	 0	 	 -r/k	D	 1/m	x	r/k	 	 -½	x	r/k	+	½	x	1/m	x	r/k	*The	characters	r,	m	and	k	denote	the	total	resources	of	an	individual,	the	number	of	 groups	 in	 the	 model,	 and	 a	 constant	 (k>0),	 respectively.	 If	 both	 groups	cooperate,	 the	 individual	remains	member	of	both	groups.	Whenever	a	defector	meets	 a	 cooperator,	 the	 individual	 leaves	 the	 latter	 group	and	 their	 resource	 is	randomly	allocated	to	a	new	group.	Upon	mutual	defection,	the	individual	leaves	one	 of	 the	 groups	 randomly,	 and	 their	 resource	 is	 reallocated	 to	 a	 new	 group	randomly.		To	 ensure	 dynamics	 in	 the	 model,	 a	 fraction	 of	 every	 individual’s	 resource	 is	reallocated	in	every	10	periods	(on	average).	The	evolutionary	stable	strategy	is	DD,	that	is,	both	groups	forbid	dual	group	membership.	In	the	bipartite	graph	of	the	 model,	 edges	 between	 groups	 are	 allowed,	 which	 represent	 the	 possible	strategic	interaction	between	two	groups,	thus	they	can	develop	norms	regarding	dual	membership	with	the	other	group.	Lack	of	edge	between	groups	practically	means	they	do	not	“see”	each	other,	they	do	not	engage	in	a	strategic	situation.	In	other	words,	 if	an	 individual	becomes	a	member	of	 two	such	groups	during	 the	resource	allocation	process,	 she	 retains	both	memberships.	The	 reasons	 for	 the	lack	of	such	strategic	interaction	in	real	life	can	be	that	the	groups	in	question	are	new	or	not	populous	enough	and	have	not	had	 the	 time	and/or	 the	resource	 to	form	 and	 spread	 such	 norms.	 A	 complete	 graph	 topology	 of	 groups,	 therefore,	means	 that	 every	 group	 can	 develop	 and	maintain	 norms	 vis-á-vis	 every	 other	group	 (i.e.	 there	 is	 an	 edge	 between	 every	 group	 node).	 In	 this	 case,	 the	evolutionary	 stable	 strategy	 spreads	 so	 that	 every	 group	 restrains	 its	members	from	 joining	 other	 ones.	 Consequently,	 the	 social	 structure	 ends	 up	 being	fragmented;	 the	projected	graph	of	 individuals	 is	disconnected,	every	 individual	is	a	member	of	only	one	group,	and	there	is	no	cooperation	between	the	members	of	different	groups	(see	Figure	1.b).	The	complete	graph	structure	of	groups	can	be	 thought	 of	 as	 a	 mature,	 static	 social	 structure,	 much	 like	 a	 very	 rigid	 caste	system.		 Besides	the	complete	graph	topology,	for	comparison,	we	explored	the	effect	of	using	scale-free	group	topology	and	star	topology.	The	scale-free	property	can	be	found	in	numerous	real	world	networks	ranging	from	friendship	networks	to	citation	and	protein	networks	(see	e.g.	Barabási	2016),	and	essentially	designates	a	 graph	 that	 has	 many	 nodes	 (in	 fact,	 the	 large	 majority)	 with	 only	 a	 few	connections,	while	there	are	very	few	nodes	with	many	connections	(for	a	strict	definition	see	the	Methods	section).	The	star	topology	is	a	graph	that	has	a	central	
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node,	 every	 other	 node	 is	 connected	 to	 this	 one,	 but	 there	 are	 no	 connections	between	 the	non-central	 nodes.	 It	would	 represent	 a	 group	 structure	where	 all	the	 groups	 can	 engage	 in	 strategic	 situation	 with	 the	 same	 social	 group	 (the	central	node),	but	other	 than	 that,	 the	members	of	 the	social	groups	are	 free	 to	join	other	 groups.	 Star	 topology	describes	 a	 social	 structure	where	every	 social	community	is	defined	against	the	same	social	group.	
Results	
Figure	 2.	 The	 size	 of	 the	 largest	 connected	 component	 in	 the	 individual	projection	 graph.	 The	 graph	 shows	 the	 simulation	 results	 using	 different	 inter-group	 topology	 (complete	 graph,	 scale-free	 and	 star	 topology,	 respectively)	 at	different	 values	 of	m	 (group	 number).	 The	 variables	 n	 and	 period	 denote	 the	number	of	individuals	and	the	length	of	the	simulation,	respectively.			We	 implemented	 a	 computer	 simulation	 to	 get	 numerical	 insights	 into	 the	models’	behavior;	the	results	can	be	seen	in	Figure	2.	For	our	purposes,	the	most	interesting	 attribute	 is	 the	 size	 of	 the	 largest	 component	 of	 the	 individual	projected	 graph.	 The	 largest	 component	 is	 the	 largest	 connected	 subgraph	 of	individuals,	i.e.,	the	most	populous	subset	of	individuals	who	can	cooperate	with	each	other,	either	directly	or	indirectly.	The	values	of	the	largest	component	were	investigated	 at	 different	 group	 numbers	 (m).	 The	 largest	 component	 in	 the	
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complete	 graph	 setting	 gets	 smaller	 and	 smaller	 as	 the	 number	 of	 groups	increases,	 suggesting	 that	 the	 society	 is	 composed	of	 small,	 closed	communities	which	 do	 not	 cooperate	 with	 each	 other	 and	 have	 approximately	 the	 same	number	 of	 members.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 in	 the	 other	 two	 settings,	 the	 largest	component	 covers	 the	 whole	 society.	 It	 is	 important	 to	 emphasize	 that	 the	evolutionary	stable	strategy	spreads	in	the	other	two	settings	as	well,	although	in	those	 cases,	 the	groups	are	not	 able	 to	 restrict	 their	members	 thoroughly	 since	they	 cannot	develop	norms	against	 every	other	group	 in	 the	 society.	Therefore,	there	 might	 be	 situations	 when	 two	 individuals	 are	 members	 of	 two	 different	groups	 which	 restrain	 their	 members	 from	 joining	 the	 other	 group,	 but	 at	 the	same	time	they	are	members	of	a	third	group	against	which	no	such	norms	exist,	thereby	 they	are	able	 to	 cooperate	with	each	other.	This	 is	 illustrated	 in	Figure	1.d.	
Conclusions	In-group	 favoritism	 can	 both	 promote	 and	 undermine	 cooperation.	 It	 has	 been	suggested	by	social	psychologists	and	scholars	of	conflict	that	antagonistic	groups	might	be	able	to	resolve	issues	by	creating	a	new,	common	identity	(Dovidio	and	Gaertner	 2010;	 Fry	 2006,	 2012)	which	 can	 serve	 as	 an	 umbrella,	 and	 in-group	favoritism	 can	 be	 extended	 to	 former	 out-group	 members.	 Historians	 have	documented	many	examples	when	different	groups,	such	as	tribes	allied	under	a	common	name	in	order	to	achieve	some	common	goal,	e.g.	capturing	lands,	came	together	 to	 defend	 against	 a	 common	 enemy	 (Gat	 and	Yakobson	2013;	 Turchin	2007)	 and,	 in	 turn,	 their	 original	 group	 identity	 faded	 away.	 For	 an	 example,	consider	 the	 largest	 German	 tribe,	 the	 Franks.	 The	 name	 Franci	 first	 appeared	around	 AD	 250	 and	 described	 a	 loose	 warrior	 confederacy	 consisting	 of	 small	tribes.	Initially,	the	Franks	were	carrying	out	defensive	and	offensive	operations	in	 the	 provinces	 of	 Gaul	 and	 later	 built	 one	 of	 the	 most	 influential	 empires	 in	Europe.	 The	 identities	 of	 the	 constituting	 tribes	 were	 preserved	 for	 centuries,	however,	 with	 time,	 eclipsed	 by	 the	 Frankish	 one	 and	 eventually	 disappeared	almost	entirely	 (Geary	1988;	Todd	2004).	These	people	basically	created	a	new	social	 group	 (Frank)	 which	 allowed	 them	 to	 retain	 tribe	 membership	 and	 still	cooperate	 at	 a	 larger	 scale.	Our	 results	 support	 and	provide	 an	 explanation	 for	these	observations	and	suggest	that	the	individuals’	ability	to	join	and	internalize	the	norms	of	more	than	one	social	group	is	crucial	for	maintaining	cooperation	in	large	populations.		
Methods.		Formally,	the	model	is	a	quadruple,	that	is,	M	=	(I,	G,	J,	T),	where:			 	 I	is	the	set	of	individuals,		
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	 	 G	is	the	set	of	groups,			 	 J	is	a	set	of	unordered	pair	(i,j)	where	i	∈	I	and	j	∈	G,			 	 T	is	a	set	of	unordered	pair	(x,	y),	where	x,	y	∈	G.		
	 G	and	T	express	group-membership	relations,	and	the	topology	of	inter-group	relations,	respectively.	If	(a,	b)	∈	T	then	a	and	b	engage	in	a	strategic	interaction,	that	 is,	 they	 play	 the	 game	 whose	 payoff	 matrix	 can	 be	 seen	 in	 Table	 1.	 The	strategy	 played	 by	 the	 ith	 group	 is	 based	 on	 a	 probability	 variable,	 pi,	 where	initially	pi	~	U	(0,1).	The	selection	mechanism	is	truncation	selection,	i.e.	the	least	performing	ten	percent	of	groups	(in	terms	of	total	resources)	copy	the	p	value	of	the	best	performing	10	percent	of	groups	(De	Jong	2006).		 The	individual	projection	graph	is	P	=	(I,	E),	where:			 	 I	is	the	set	of	individuals,			 	 E	is	a	set	of	unordered	pair	(m,	n)	where	m,	n	∈	I.	(m,	n)	∈	E	⇔	there	exist	a	g	∈	G	such	that	(m,	g)	and	(n,	g)	∈	J.	In	other	words,	this	is	a	graph	of	individuals,	where	an	edge	exists	between	 two	 individuals	 if	 they	are	members	of	 the	same	group(s).		 Star	topology:	there	is	an	x0	∈	G,	such	that	for	every	y	∈	G	(x0,	y)	∈	T	and	for	all	(x,	y)	where	x	≠	x0	and	y	≠	x0	(x,	y)	∉	T.		 Scale-free	topology:	the	degree	distribution	of	the	graph	is	the	following:	P(k)	~	k-3	where	 k	 is	 the	 number	 of	 connections.	 The	 equation	 expresses	 that	 the	probability	that	a	randomly	chosen	node	has	k	connections	is	asymptotically	k-3.		 The	 scale-free	 group-topology	 was	 constructed	 using	 the	 Barabási-Albert	algorithm	 (Barabási	 and	 Albert	 1999),	 the	 giant	 component	 is	 computed	 using	depth-first	search	algorithm,	and	the	actual	agent-based	model	was	implemented	in	Java	language.	
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